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m i l e s 
The most glorious act of patriotism is that of buUding up the 
district in which one's lot is cast; by deeds of self-sacrifice, acts 
of goodness and generosity—severed from all selfishness, 
irrespective of gain or reward, praise or censure. The noble 
outiook—great consumation—far off though it may be—the 
betterment of the present—tiie sunrise of hope—the radiant day 
dawn of prosperity and content for aU; the new-bom created 
future, fuU of golden wealth, stirs the soul of the patriot, and he 
fives in the glorious sUvery future his noble mind has fashioned 
up. 
The Ulawarra or South Coast Tourist Guide. The South Coast 
Tourist Union: Sydney 1903, p.7. 
. . . it ties nearer the sea than it should . . . For a country to have 
the sea nearby is pleasant enough for the purpose of everyday 
life, but in fact it is a 'salty-sharp and bitter neighbour' in more 
senses than one. It fUls the land with wholesaUng and retailing, 
breeds shifty and deceitful habits in a man's soul, and makes the 
citizens distmstful and hostUe, not only among themselves, but 
also in their dealings with the world outside. 
Plato, The Laws. Translated by T.J. Saunders. Penguin: 
Harmondsworth, England 1975, p. 159. 
INTRODUCTION 
During the long economic boom that foUowed World War II the WoUongong district of 
New South Wales emerged as a coal, iron and steel producer of world stature. Its population, 
boosted to over 250,000 people by the labour demands of local industry, centred on the 
government buUt deepwater harbour at Port Kembla, and the post war immigration programme, 
made WoUongong one of AustraHa's largest cities. When the boom disintegrated and AustraUa, 
in common with other advanced capitalist nations, began to undergo a process of 
deindustrialisation, WoUongong faced a social and economic crisis. The iron and steel 
industry, the district's largest employer, more than halved its workforce in the 1980s. The 
local mines, most of which belonged to the same employer, the Broken HiU Proprietary, shared 
a simUar fate. 
In part this crisis arose from the decision of some third world countries to restmcture 
the international steel economy by offering incentives to Westem investors for the establishment 
of up to date steel plants, giving these countries the highest quality product far more cheaply 
than that offered to them by the high wage producers of Europe, America and AustraUa. The 
Broken HUl Proprietary now found cheaper, perhaps better, steel confironting it in world and 
AustraUan markets. It responded by modernising its plant, to improve productivity and 
profitabiUty. The shedding of labour assisted those objectives. Consequentiy, WoUongong's 
small businesses suffered as pay packets were replaced increasingly with unemployment 
benefits. 
International market forces, arising from decisions made many thousands of miles from 
WoUongong, had ended not only 30 years of uninterrapted material prosperity and security. 
The crisis was yet more profound than that It had destabUised the local economy, weakening 
the very foundation of that prosperity—the market position and thus the employment and wage 
generating capacity of mining and manufacturing. Mining had been the mainstay of 
WoUongong's economy since the mid 1880s, supplemented and then largely supplanted by iron 
and steel manufacturing fix»m the 1920s. 
The local business community, aware of the impact rather than the nature and causes of 
the downturn, called for greater diversity in the district's economy. An economy resting on 
essentially one industry, said its leaders, was bound to bring disaster. This was a new idea for 
WoUongong. Since the mid nineteenth century its businessmen had promoted consistentiy, 
indeed obsessively, the notion that the district's destiny was linked indissolubly to mining and 
metal manufacturing. Wollongong was in their view fated to become 'the Black Country of 
New South Wales' or 'the Birmingham of the South'. These men made Wollongong a 
company town where, in the good years, the slogan 'What's good for BHP is good for 
WoUongong' became a truism. 
However, by the 1980s, tiie owners of national and international capital had decided 
that that phase of WoUongong's history was coming to a close. The district's businessmen 
responded in two ways. First, not fully realising that industriaUsation in WoUongong had 
passed its peak, they sought to render the place more attractive to manufacturing capital. They 
embarked on a programme to reverse its image as a district divided by inappropriate class 
loyalties. In their view this was the major deterrent to potential investors who were unwiUing 
to risk their capital in a centre of union militancy. The co-operation of workers and their unions" 
was sought to send a message to the outside world that WoUongong had discarded its 
nineteenth century industrial attitudes. Reports and rumours abounded of the pent up 
investment waiting to flow into the area once this became more generaUy known. Everything 
ranging fi-om fish canneries to 'high tech' aerospace component manufacturers was canvassed. 
None of it eventuated, and WoUongong's business leaders tumed to their second response. 
This mvolved the erasure of WoUongong's other image as a colourless industrial town, 
ingrained in the local and national consciousness by near 130 years of unrelenting labour, 
begun by the businessmen's nineteenth century ancestors, to produce just that result. UntU the 
1980s clouds of dust from the coal stockpUes at the steelworks and plumes of smoke rising 
from its smokestacks were interpreted less as poUution than as signs that aU was weU with 
WoUongong. 
Throughout the 1980s, ably led by the Lord Mayor, a real estate agent and earthmoving 
contractor, local businessmen launched a policy of 'greening the city'. Elected to represent 
Wollongong in the State Parliament, the Mayor devoted considerable effort to promoting the 
new image that he and his colleagues were constmcting. With the possibiUty of diversifying 
the local economy's manufacturing base looking ever more remote, WoUongong's potential as a 
tourist destination took centre place in their thinking. HighUghting the district's relatively 
unspoiled beaches, its forested escarpment and the siurounding dairy farming region, they 
estabUshed a high profile tourist information centte and gave the district a new name—the 
Leisure Coast. WoUongong's destiny was being rewritten, with the skyline of the New 
Jemsalem to be dominated by hotels, convention centtes and high rise beachside apartment 
blocks in place of factories, smokestacks and stockpiled coal. Some tourist capital has made its 
way into the district, creating some employment, though mainly of a seasonal, part time and 
casual nature. Wliether such a poUcy wiU ever fully offset the impact of losing near 20,000 fuU 
time jobs in the mining and manufacturing industries, and induce an econonoic renaissance in 
WoUongong remains to be seen. As this thesis wiU demonstrate, the deUberate engineering of 
regional economic change is no simple undertaking. Powerful individuals, institutions and 
forces outside the district, and beyond the control of its inhabitants and tiieir leaders, exert far 
more influence over its destiny than can tiiose working from the inside. Some create contexts,' 
others must work within them. 
Within their limits, though, WoUongong's business leaders have shown a real capacity 
to mould the attitudes, expectations and aspirations of the local popitiation. In both the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as they worked first to move their economy from a 
dependence on agriculture and dairying to mining and manufacturing, and then from the latter to 
tourism and conventions, probably their single greatest success lay in the restracturing of the 
minds of that population. In the 1980s the aim of this was to imbue individuals with tiie notion 
that WoUongong's industrial phase was dead and must now be buried. The district's 
newspaper, the Ulawarra Mercury, its two radio stations and its television broadcaster took up 
the challenge. They ran extensive campaigns promoting WoUongong's new future as the 
Leisure Coast and substituting the language and images of community for those of class. 
SimUarly, residents were fed media images designed to have them think of the district in terms 
of the natural beauty of tiie surrounding region. AU of tins, it was beUeved, would set tiie seal 
on WoUongong's new, post industrial image. This was vital. Since the district's business 
community was also pressing the New Soutii Wales and Commonwealth governments to 
provide pubUc money for the improvement of road, rati and port facUities, it was important that 
tiiey were able to indicate some evidence of new community attitudes and expectations which, 
they asserted, gave them a claim on the public purse."' 
The point of it aU was that local business people required another means of extracting a 
profit from the district. Having reaUsed that their district was entering a phase of industrial 
decUne, rather than experiencing a cyclical economic downturn, they took control of local 
public poUcy in an attempt to restmcmre WoUongong's economy. At the heart of that effort 
was the beUef that this would be achieved only if WoUongong was in some way made attractive 
to national and international capital. Then- aim, their motives and their methods were precisely 
those of their nineteenth century forebears. That coalition of shopkeepers, newspaper 
proprietors, providers of professional and commercial services, self employed tradesmen, 
landowners and others, had decided in the 1850s that their only hope of a constantiy rising level 
of material prosperity was to move die local economy away from farming to mining and, in tiie 
longer term, to manufacturing. The single greatest obstacle to the achievement of that goal was 
the absence of a natural harbour in the WoUongong distria. 
Wollongong lies on the east coast of AustraUa about 50 mUes south of Sydney, the 
capital of New South Wales. Its surrounding district, sometimes referted to loosely as 
Ulawarta, the larger region of which tiie district is a part,2 (see Map following) is defined in the 
west by the Ulawarra escarpment, some 1200-1300 feet high, and in the east by the Pacific 
Ocean, Between the two mns the WoUongong peneplain, about 12 miles wide at the coastal 
viUage of SheUharbour, marking the soutiiem end of tiie district, and receding graduaUy untU it 
merges with the escarpment and the ocean at Coalcliff, a littie under 25 miles north of 
The preceding account of the impact of the end of the post war boom in Wollongong, and the response to 
it of the local business community, is the author's interpretation of those years, drawn from the 
experience of having lived through and taken a close interest in it Sources which confirm it are: J. 
Schultz, Steel City Blues. Penguin: Ringwood, Victoria 1985, and Four Corners: 'The Callous Country'. 
Australian Broadcasting Corporation 1991 (first broadcast on ABC TV, 18 November 1991). See also L. 
Richardson, The Bitter Years: Wollongong During the Great Depression. Hale & Iremonger. Sydney 
1984, Chapter 1 ('The birth of a steeltown'). 
The niawarra region comprises the area between the Port Hacking River, about 16 miles south of Sydney, 
and the Shoalhaven River, some 40 miles south of Wollongong. Bounded by the niawarra Range in the 
west and the Pacific Ocean in the east, the region may be said to contain three districts: Wollongong; 
Kiama, centred on the coastal town of Kiama, 20 miles south of Wollongong, and Shoalhaven. 
•THE ILLAWAJ^RA REGION 
Wollongong, Kiama and Shoalhaven Districts 
ESaETCOCEaK 
SheUharbour. Three namral features dominate tiie area around Wollongong: Lake Ulawarra, 
with its 22 square mUe sheet of water just five imles south of the town, which on a map appears 
the obvious site for a harbour but is in fact relatively shaUow and cut from the sea by dunes and 
sandbanks;^ and Mounts Kembla and Keira, the former six mUes soutii west of WoUongong 
and the latter a few miles directly behind the town, both rising over 1500 feet above the plain. 
Coal had been discovered in the district in 1797 by the survivors of a shipwreck but, for 
reasons explained in Chapter 1, no real attempt to mine it was undertaken untU 1849. Instead, 
WoUongong's place in the economy of mid nineteenth century New South Wales was secured 
by the quality of its dairy produce, particularly its butter. As Joseph Gorden, a visiting and 
deservedly minor English poet, was moved to observe in his 'WoUongong and Ulawarra' of 
1861: 
This fact, e'er since I crossed the seas, 
I rarely fail at meals to utter 
That Bathurst stands unmatched for cheese. 
And WoUongong for yellow butter.'* 
That reality and its cortesponding image remained good untU the mid/late 1880s, from which 
time WoUongong's economy responded less to the price fetched by a pound of butter in Sydney_ 
than to tiie demand for coal in Sydney and the markets of the Asia-Pacific region. By the late 
1880s the Wollongong district was firmly estabUshed, behind tiie Newcastie coalfield 100 mUes 
north of Sydney, as the second largest coal producer in tiie AustraUan Colonies, accounting for 
one fifth to a quarter of New South Wales output and about one quarter of exports to overseas 
markets.^ The new coal economy brought growtii. Between die censuses of 1851 and 1891 
tiie district's population rose by 333 per cent, from 3099 to 13,420,® the buUc of which 
depended on coal mining for its UveUhood. 
This tiiesis seeks to explain tiiat transformation by asking the question, 'Why was a coal 
trade established in tiie WoUongong district of New South Wales in the second half of tiie 
3 See R.W. Young & AJI.M. Johnson, 'The Physical Setting: Environmental Hazards and Urban 
Planning'. In R. Robinson (Ed.), Urban Ulawarra. Sorrett Publishing: Melbourne 1977, p.38. 
4 J. Gordon, Botany Bay and Other Poems. Arthur HaU, Virtue & Co.: London 1861. 
5 Calculated from figures in Annual Report of the Department of Mines, New South Wales. 1885-1889. 
See also Appendix 2 to this thesis: 'The Wollongong Coalfield: Exports and Production, 1875-1889'. 
6 Calculated from 'New South Wales Census—1851'. In Supplement to the New South Wales 
Government Gazette, No.l28.7 November 1851, and Residts of a Census of New South Wales Taken for 
the Night of 31st March, 1901. Government Printer Sydney 1904. 
nineteenth century?' The direction of the argument derives from answers to five subsidiary 
questions: who wanted this change to occur, why, how did tiiey go about it, to what extent did 
they succeed, and who was responsible for that success? 
Three groups were involved in the process: the local business community, the coal 
companies and the government of New South Wales. Of the three only the first actuaUy wished 
to transform the local economy and developed a clear poHcy to that end. Its centrepiece was the 
procuring for WoUongong of a large, safe, deep and weU equipped coal port. In the absence of 
such a port WoUongong coal had to be taken to Sydney in smaU coastal sailing vessels, where it 
would be loaded onto larger vessels for transhipment to intercolonial and overseas destinations. 
This doublehandUng added to the cost of the coal and caused some deterioration in its quality. 
Although it was more easily and, therefore, cheaply won than Newcastie coal, these 
disadvantages did not aUow the southern coal to compete as effectively as the latter could for 
market shares. 
WhUe such factors provided a rational economic basis for the businessmen's policy, 
that policy was at heart a cargo cult approach to local development. Their central belief, 
reiterated time and again, was that if WoUongong possessed a decent port then mining 
capitaUsts would msh to invest in the coalfield. Odd though it may sound for businessmen, the 
state of demand for coal had Uttie impact on their single minded pursuit of their goal. So 
obsessed were they with the potential offered by a coal trade for gaining access to the pay 
packets of an increasing number of regularly paid workers, that they refiised to abandon their 
poUcy no matter what the obstacles. Only once, in 1870, foUowing two short but deep 
recessions, did tiiey waver and lose direction. 
Regardless of their ambitions, the businessmen of WoUongong required someone to 
spend a considerable sum of money for the constmction, equipping and maintenance of a coal 
port. Provincial shopkeepers neither possessed nor had access to that kind of money, and no 
other owners of private capital came forward to provide it. Consequentiy, the businessmen 
designated the matter a 'pubUc' one, properly tiie concern of government which, they claimed, 
had a duty to provide for its citizens what they coitid not acquire by themselves. 
Much of this thesis is concerned with explaining exactly how a polincaUy and 
economically unimportant band of provincial businessmen succeeded in establishing and 
sustaining a long term relationship with the government of New South Wales. Without that 
relationship their coal policy would have remained nothing more than an idea. Only the credit 
and authority of the Colonial government, which aUowed it to bortow private capital in London 
for pubUc works in New South Wales, gave the businessmen any chance of securing their coal 
port. 
The government's role in the restmcturing of the Wollongong economy was not the 
outcome of any settied or prospective economic poUcy of its own. Rather, it was the inabUity 
of Ministries to control ParUament which aUowed WoUongong's businessmen to draw them 
into a relationship fi-om which they found it difficult to extricate themselves. In the period 
under study ParUamentary poUtics was conducted not by parties but by factions. The latter, in 
contrast to parties, coalesced around prominent individual leaders, did not lead a continuous 
existence and, until the free trade versus protection debate of the late 1880s, were 
undifferentiated by ideology. Factions provided a focus for Parliamentary activity. However, 
individual factions were never numerically large enough to sustain Ministries, which were' 
usuaUy pieced together in complex factional deals. The situation was further compUcated by tiie 
presence of independent Members whose uncertain support was at times aU that separated 
Ministries from poUtical life or death. In such finely balanced simations, a weU organised and 
highly motivated extra Parliamentary group, controlling pubUc poUcy and the pubUc in its 
electorate, was capable of deUvering friendly Members to faction leaders and doing other 
political favours for Ministries. 
The definitive work on the faction system in New South Wales remains that of Peter 
Loveday and AUan Martin,'' which provides one of the main secondary sources for tiie present 
work. Indeed, without their exhaustive analysis of division Usts, electoral poUtics and the rise 
and faU of Ministries, many of the statements upon which parts of this thesis rest could have 
P. Loveday & A.W. Martin, Parliament Factions and Parties: The First Thirty Years of Responsible 
Government in New South Wales, 1856-1889. Melbourne University Press: Carlton, Victoria 1966. See 
also: A.W. Martin, 'The Legislative Assembly of New South Wales, 1856-1900'. Australian Journal of 
Politics and History, 2(1), November 1956; P.Loveday & A.W. Martin, 'Colonial Politics Before 1890'. 
In P. Loveday, A.W. Martin & R.S. Parker (Eds), The Emergence of the Australian Party System. Hale 
& Iremonger Sydney 1977, and P. Loveday, A.W. Martin & P. Weller, 'New South Wales'. In ibid. 
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been arrived at only after prohibitively labour intensive research. They have claimed that one of 
the main supports of faction politics was the economic fragmentation of New South Wales 
before the end of the nineteenth century.^ However, this proposition was not tested by 
Loveday and Martin, whose focus was the electoral and ParUamentary system of the Colony. 
This thesis does test tiie claim, by examining in detail the attempt of the businessmen of 
WoUongong to estabUsh a coal trade in tiieir district between tiie 1850s and the 1880s. It is also 
one of tiie very few studies of economic development in this period to examine in some detaU 
the role of government and its relationship with business at the district or regional level.^ 
This assumes particular importance given tiiat one of the major features of capitaUsm in 
New South Wales at that time was its regional character. CapitaUsm had not evolved to the 
point where the econoniic life of the Colony began to be dominated by influential individual 
owners of capital or large corporations. There were influential capitaUsts and companies but, as 
this thesis wiU show, their capacity to determine government poUcy was heavUy conditioned by 
regional business interests. In a 1972 article on the history of government raUway poUcy, P.N. 
Lamb identified this as a feature of the nineteenth century AustraUan experience which required 
closer investigation,'"' To this author's knowledge. Lamb's caU has not been heeded. Yet it 
was this regional capitaUsm, as it may be termed, which provided one of the main supports of 
the system of faction poUtics. Its natiural poUtical expression was at one extreme tiie infamous 
'roads and bridges' Member whose inteUecmal and ideological horizons did not extend much 
beyond tiie boundaries of his electorate."' "• At its best it produced the factions which gave the 
ParUamentary system tiie cohesion which aUowed it to operate effectively, providing a number 
of basic but unprofitable services required for the continued good health of a maturing capitaUst 
8 Loveday & Martin, Parliament Factions and Parties, op.cit., p. 152. 
9 Others include: I.M. Laszlo, Railway Policies and the Development of Northern New South Wales. 
Unpublished M.A. Thesis. University of New England, 1956; R.SXee, The Politics of Shipping and 
Railway Construcdon in the Clarence Valley, 1888-1892. Unpublished B.A. Hons Thesis. Macquarie 
University, 1977; RJ.R. Donley, From Wheat Port to Industrial Town—A History of Port Pirie (1873-
96). Unpublished B.A. Hons Thesis. University of Adelaide, 1965, and G. Wills, An Examination of the 
Electorate of New England, 1880-1889, With a View to Discover the Problem Behind Local Political 
Activity and the Forms that this Activity Took. Unpublished B.A. Hons Thesis. University of New 
England, 1960. See also 'The Building of the Great Northern Railway—A Symposium'. Armidale and 
District Historical Society Journal and Proceedings. No,20, January 1977. 
10 PĴ J. Lamb, 'Historians and Australian Railways'. Australian Journal of Politics and History, 18(2), 
August 1972, p.258. 
11 See P. Loveday, 'The Member and His Constituents in New South Wales in the Mid-Nineteenth 
Century'. Australian Journal of Politics and History, 5(2), November 1959. 
market society—education, law and order, immigration, transport and communications. In a 
society which from the 1850s to the 1880s experienced an almost unintermpted economic 
boom, and in place of ideological division was united by a desire for development and material 
progress, liberal individualism provided its dominant values and Parliamentary factions 
represented the limit of its need for a strong central government. Only with the Colony wide 
coUapse of the boom and the accompanying social distress and threats to profit levels and law 
and order, did New Soutii Wales market capitalism require a stronger degree of government 
regulation to save and revive it, and produce continuous parties to represent the interests of 
labour and of the different sectors of capital affected by the coUapse. 
UntU that point, if the Wollongong coal trade is taken as a giude, the larger companies 
in the regions took Uttie direct interest in electoral poUtics. As long as their basic needs were 
being met—an adequately educated and skiUed labour supply and an efficient transport and 
communications system—tiiey tended to stay out of direct contact with ParUamentary poUtics at 
the local level. Only tiiose mine proprietors with a clear interest in the schemes proposed by 
WoUongong's businessmen sought to have themselves elected as the local Member or to 
involve themselves in the process of getting a particular individual into the seat 
In fact, the coal companies operated independentiy of the ambitions and plans of local 
businessmen and of the involvement with them of govemmenL The Wollongong coal 
companies had no interest in promoting tiie transformation of tiie local economy. Owners of 
capital invested in the WoUongong coalfield simply because they beUeved that the state of 
demand in the AustraUan and Asia-Pacific markets was sufficient to return an acceptable rate of 
profit on their investment. Employment of mineworkers and the payment of wages were 
merely by products of tiiat activity. The first mines on the field were opened before a coal port 
was avaUable for use. Indeed, fixim the 1850s aU but two of the companies which commenced 
operations in the district did so from their own ocean jetties. 
While such jetties were not infrequentiy destroyed or damaged by heavy seas, they 
aUowed immediate access to a depth of water which could accommodate vessels capable of 
sailing direct to intercolonial and overseas markets. Many shipowners and captains were not 
keen to risk their vessels or lives in such conditions and, consequentiy, most of the district's 
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coal continued to be taken to Sydney in smaller coastal vessels. Nonetheless, the continued 
presence of the coal companies and their jetties was sufficient evidence of tiieir abUity to operate 
profitably from Wollongong. In general the mine proprietors were of the view that if tiie local 
entrepreneurs were able to persuade government to constmct a coal port, that was fine. 
However, they also saw that Unking the coalfield to a port might bring other companies to the 
district, and whUe tiiey paid due respect to notions of free enterprise tiiey had no particular wish 
to increase the number of its practitioners in their district 
Hence, the relationship that was established between business and government in 
WoUongong from the 1850s had littie to do with the coal companies. Rather, their presence 
was desired by a coaUtion of local businessmen who used the opportunities provided by faction 
politics and inherently weak Ministries to have the latter given them a means of attracting 
mining capital to the district 
The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that neither the activities of local 
businessmen nor of government had any great influence on the decision of owners of capital to 
open mines on the WoUongong coalfield. Obviously, without these decisions there would have 
been no WoUongong coal trade, but they are to be explained in terms of market conditions,' 
expectations of profitability, cost considerations and other factors of conventional industry 
location theory,''2 rather than by the manipulation or regulation of these factors by smaU 
business and/or government. 
These considerations place this thesis in the context of arguments about the nature of 
economic development in AustraUa in the second half of the nineteenth century. One method of 
answering the question as to why a coal trade was estabUshed in the WoUongong district during 
that period would be to focus the argument on the economic factors or forces which led owners 
of capital to invest there. A model for such an approach is the 'staple theory' of economic 
development, bortowed from Canadian economic historians''^ and applied to the Australian 
nineteenth century experience by J.W. McCarty in the 1960s. McCarty proposed an 
12 For a brief account of the operation of such factors in the Wollongong coalfield see M.G.A. Wilson, 
'Changing Pauems of Pit Location on the New South Wales Coalfields*. Annals of the Association of 
American Geographers. 58(1), March 1968. pp.88-9. 
13 See C.B. Schedvin, 'Essays in Bibliography and Criticism, LXXXI. Midas and the Merino: A 
Perspective on Australian Economic Historiography*. Economic History Review (Second Series), 52(4), 
November 1979, p,549. 
11 
explanation for Australia, as a colony of recent settiement without a domestic market sufficient 
to sustain large scale manufacturing, tiiat made it a matter of identifying appropriate natural 
resources (staples) whose further development as export commodities was conditioned by two 
factors: 'the available technology . . . and the state of demand'.'''^ A.L. Lougheed 
strengthened this interpretation. Unking AustraUan development more firmly to tiie level of 
international trade. ""̂  More recentiy, W.A. Sinclair based his account of AustraUa's economic 
history on 'a variant of the staple theory of economic growth'.''^ This theory ran counter to that 
of Noel Butiin, who suggested in his major smdy of the AustraUan economy between 1861 and 
1900 that, whUe dependent on British capital: 
to supplement local AustraUan savings . . . the rate of AustraUan growth was 
not intimately dependent on export receipts; and the composition of output 
and the rate of growth appear to have been determined predominantly by 
local AustraUan considerations.'''^ 
Happily, elements of both theories fit tiie case of the WoUongong coal trade. The long 
economic boom and accelerated population growth experienced by the AustraUan Colonies 
following the gold mshes of the 1850s and which persisted untU the coUapse of the 1890s, 
required energy to sustain them. Coal rich New South Wales was virtuaUy the only suppUer.''^ 
At tiie same time, the expanding activities of the great European maritime powers in the Asia-
Pacific region added to the puU of market forces on the coal resources of the Colony. UntU the 
1880s the mining capitaUsts who decided to take WoUongong coal into diose markets were aU 
AustraUan based, almost aU in Sydney. British mining capital did not begin to make its way on 
to tiie coalfield untU tiie late 1880s, 
14 J.W. McCarty, 'The Staple Approach in Australian Economic History'. Business Archives and History, 
4(1), February 1964, p.5. 
15 A.L. Lougheed, 'International Trade Theory and Economic Growth'. Australian Economic History 
Review, 8. 1968. 
16 W.A. Sinclair, The Process of Economic Development in Australia. Longman Cheshire: Melbourne 
1976, p.l6. 
17 N.G. Butiin, Investment in Australian Economic Development 1861-1900. Cambridge University Press: 
London 1964, p.5. 
18 In Queensland production began in 1860, but remained small compared to New South Wales (see E.F. 
Dunne, 'Brief History of the Coal Mining Industry in Queensland'. Royal Historical Society of 
Queensland Journal, 4(3), 1950, p.319). The mining of coal in Victoria and Tasmania did not begin to 
any degree until the late 1880s (see RL. Crivelli, 'History of the Coal Industry in Australia'. Royal 
AustraUan Historical Society Journal and Proceedings, 16(3), 1930, p.l59). In Westem Australia coal 
was produced 'in quantity' only after 1899 (see L.W. Johnson, 'A History of the CoUie Coal Mining 
Industry*. University Studies in Western Australian History, 3 (1), September 1957, p.9). South 
Australia had 'no economically usable coal' and that which did exist was of poor quality (see CM, 
Willington, 'The Mineral Industry Contribution to the Development of South Australia'. Proceedings of 
the Royal Geographical Society of Australasia, 62,1961, p.50). 
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McCarty's staple theory was also criticised by J.P. Fogarty, who condemned i t along 
with any theory that made technical factors such as markets, costs and technology the 
determinants of economic development, as having littie abiUty to 'of themselves provide a 
sufficient explanation of why particular industries were established in different regions at 
particular times'."'^ He concluded his smdy of the AustraUan wheat industry in the second half 
of tiie nineteenth century by stating that an adequate answer to such questions must be sought 
not only in 'economic and technical factors', but in 'the vital role that the prevailing social and 
political institutions and attitudes may have played in influencing tiie choice of staple'.2° 
Fogarty's view has limited appUcation to the development of the WoUongong coal trade. 
That Wollongong coal lay undisturbed for over half a cenmry foUowing its discovery by 
Europeans in 1797 was the result not only of geographic and technological factors, but of a 
poUtical arrangement giving a single company, the AustraUan Agricultural Company, a legal 
monopoly over the Colony's coal industry. However, when that monopoly was withdrawn the 
WoUongong trade grew slowly and cannot be said to have accelerated untU the late 1870s— 
something which can be accounted for only by reference to 'economic' factors. 
On the question of how, when and by whom a natural resource is recognised as a 
marketable commodity and then developed as such, Fogarty's criticism of technical 
explanations may have some small contribution to make in explaining the WoUongong coal 
trade. Local businessmen took every opportunity to promote the quaUty of Wollongong coal, 
particularly in Sydney and in Melboume, the single largest export market for New South Wales 
coal in the period under smdy. Their leaders wrote tfrelessly to newspapers, shipping 
companies and manufacturers both defending and extoUing the steam generating qualities of 
their coal. The influence of such activity in generating awareness of the Wollongong coalfield 
and thus investment is impossible to gauge accurately. In addition, tiieir strenuous efforts to 
obtain a harbour for the district may have exerted some influence on investors. Again, this 
cannot be calculated, but given that owners of capital were looking for at least medium term 
returns, the extent to which tiiey were swayed by tiie possibUity of local businessmen obtaining 
19 J.P. Fogarty, 'The Staple Approach and the Role of the Government in Australian Economic 
Development: The Wheat Indmxry'. Business Archives and History, 6(1), February 1966. 
20 ifeid., pp.35 & 52. 
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a first rate coal port for a provincial town was Ukely to have been a minor consideration, if 
considered at alL 
The only political factor working unambiguously in favour of the development of tiie 
Wollongong coalfield was the absence of any regulation of investment by the Colonial 
government The demand for New South Wales coal was being met and could have continued 
to be so by the Newcastie coalfield alone. Indeed, the expansion of tiie WoUongong trade only 
added to the industry's chronic capacity for overproduction, marked by the coUapse of several 
local companies in the downturns of tiie mid 1860s, 1870 and the 1890s. A Uberal capitaUst 
Parliament untarnished by salaried Members until 1890 and thus dominated by men of 
independent means.^l could not even conceive of placing restrictions on investment. Anyone 
with sufficient capital could open a coal mine, regardless of the fact that the potential for 
disaster in the industry's abiUty to overproduce was weU understood by the authorities from at 
least tiie 1870s. 
Despite this liberal individuaUst reluctance to regulate investment, the governments of 
the AustraUan Colonies played a significant role in economic development in the boom decades 
foUowing the gold mshes, significantiy larger than in other capitaUst economies. One estimate' 
for the period states that 'the relative role of govemment in AustraUa in gross capital formation 
was over nine times as great as the share of govemment in America'.22 Between 1860 and 
1900 Australian governments accounted for half of aU capital imported into the Colonies and 
about 40 per cent, of domestic capital formation, almost aU of it in the areas of transport and 
communications.23 The apparent novelty of such a large pubUc sector share of economic 
activity led some contemporaries to dub it 'colonial socialism', a term not discarded by 
twentieth century economic historians such as Noel Butiin. For Butiin, writing in 1959, 
colonial sociaUsm was marked by: 
positive govemment intervention, with the central feature of large-scale 
outiays for capital formation . . . and . . . a . . . pattern of partnership 
between govemment and private institutions to which the Australian 
21 See Martin, 'The Legislative Assembly of New South Wales, 1856-1900', op.cit. 
22 S. Kemek, 'Australian and American Characteristics: The Influence of Differences in Economic Prosperity 
and the Power of Private Business'. University Studies in History. 5(3), 1969, p. 16. 
23 N.G. Butiin, A, Barnard & JJ, Pincus, Government and Capitalism: Public and Private Choice in 
Twentieth Century Australia. George Allen & Unwin: Sydney 1982, p.l6. 
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economy was subject for most of the second half of the nineteenth 
century-^"^ 
Butiin, cortectiy, did not press the claim to sociaUst forms of market intervention by the 
Colonial governments. As he noted in a more recent study, it was the limited capacity of tiie 
private sector to deliver imports of labour and capital sufficient to generate high rates of 
economic growth that induced the former to press govemment to 'assume the role of 
accelerating these transfers'.25 Far from being a doctrinaire approach to economic 
development, ButUn stated, colonial sociaUsm was rather 'an ad hoc solution to the problem of 
developing local resources in the face of considerable physical difficulties'.26 That is, not 
having experienced an industrial revolution of its own to allow capital accumulation sufficient 
for major domestic economic development the Australian private sector was compeUed to 
bortow from a society which had—Britain. Hence, as ButUn points out private interests 
accepted a relatively high level of govemment involvement in the economy 'because this direct 
intervention was perceived as predominantiy . . . supportive of rather than displacing or 
impeding major private interests'.2^ 
Thus it was sociaUsm only in the most general sense of govemment being involved in., 
the direction of economic activity. The concern of government was to sustain private activity 
through capital formation in essential sectors of the economy that were unlikely to return an 
acceptable rate of profit, if any, on the investment Such undertakings (mainly roads, bridges, 
ports, raUways and telegraphs) were therefore designated as 'public' and their cost socialised 
through appropriations of government revenue and/or loans. Only in that restricted sense was 
the economic intervention of Colonial governments sociaUst. 
Butiin's notion of a 'partnership' between government and the private sector has been 
criticised, particularly by left wing economic historians such as Ken Buckley and Ted 
Wheelwright. They see it as 'misleading', implying that 'the state was an independent force in 
its own right, tiiat it chose to aUy itself with private interests and could presumably break away 
24 N.G. Butiin, 'Colonial Socialism in Australia, 1860-1900'. In H.GJ. Aitken (Ed.), The State and 
Economic Growth. Social Science Research Council: New Yoric 1959, p.27. 
25 Budin, Barnard & Pincus, op.cit.. p. 14. 
26 BuUin, 'Colonial Socialism*, op.cit.. p.35. 
27 Butiin, Barnard & Pincus, op.cit., pp.13-18 ('The nature of colonial socialism'), and Butiin, 'Colonial 
Socialism', loc.cit. 
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from them if govemment felt so inclined'. A capitalist state in a capitalist society, stated 
Buckley and Wheelwright, had neither the inclination nor the means of doing so.28 Andrew 
Wells' recent and detailed smdy of capitalism in the eastern Australian Colonies in the 
nineteenth century lends support to such a view.29 Nonetheless, the New South Wales coal 
trade presents a case where both Butiin and his critics have something to contribute to an 
explanation of the economic role of govemment 
Undeniably, the coal trade was conducted upon capitalist lines. However, the 
Newcastle and WoUongong coal trades were not treated simUarly by govemment As this 
thesis wUl show, Newcastle developed ahead of WoUongong because of geographic factors 
which made the northern coal far easier to exploit. From that point huge sums of pubUc money 
were poured into the development of Newcastle Harbour as a major coal port. This 
complemented the inflow of private mining capital, which took advantage of the natural setting 
andpubUc spending on export faciUties. To tiiis extent a 'partnership' between the pubUc and 
private sectors was forged. The WoUongong coalfield was a different proposition. There the 
coal companies made their own way with very Uttie public support. When govemment did 
involve itself in attempts to develop that district's coal trade, it did so in no sense of 
partnership. Rather, through electoral manipulation govemment was effectively hijacked, not 
by major private interests, but by a tight knit group of provincial entrepreneurs, and compeUed 
to yield public money for an exercise in economic speculation. 
That compulsion provided the basis on which the New South Wales govemment 
invested, between 1860 and 1889, well over £1 mUUon of public money in a coal port for 
Wollongong and in a raUway to link tiie coalfield with Sydney Harbour, The coal port was too 
small to make Wollongong a major player in the Colony's coal trade, but the Sydney-
WoUongong raUway was a different matter. Newcastie coal proprietors and business interests 
beUeved that the latter, by giving the WoUongong mines access to a world class port, threatened 
tiie destmction of their trade by flooding the market with cheap, high quaUty southern steaming 
coal. The pastoralists of the Colony also felt tiireatened, seeing the construction of such an 
28 K. Buckley & T. Wheelwright No Paradise for Workers: Capitalism and the Common People in 
Australia 1788-1914. Oxford University Press: Melbourne 1988, p. 106. 
29 A. Wells, Constructing Capitalism: An Economic History of Eastern Australia, 1788-1901. Allen & 
Unwin: Sydney 1989, especially pp. 104-9 ('The colonial state in capitalist relations of production'). 
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expensive 'branch Une' as a disturbing departure from the settied policy of continuing to push 
the main tmnk Unes into the interior so as to lower the cost of transporting wool to Sydney. 
The result was a regional economic straggle, with WoUongong's businessmen fighting vainly 
against two of the Colony's most powerful groups. Each competed vigorously to gain control 
of both the Ministry and the ParUament in order to ensure that its private interests became pubUc 
policy and were enforced as such. Thus, Butiin's concept of partnership, whUe appropriate for 
describing the settied relationship of govemment with pastoraUsts over raUway poUcy, and with 
Newcastle coal proprietors and business interests over harbour policy, broke down when 
challenged by another group whose interests were not being met by such arrangements. 
Thus, the nature of government's involvement in the economy cannot be accounted for 
on the simple basis of a partnership, however understood, with the private sector. In an era 
when capitaUsm had not yet matured and the Colony's economy was fragmented by regional 
interests the private sector had many faces, any one of which might turn aggressive if its needs 
were not being met or, indeed, if its interests were threatened by govemment Although its role 
was essentially to fashion 'general and abstract . , . laws [which] . . . would respect and 
safeguard tiie market's autonomy and capacity for self-regulation',^0 the nineteenth century 
Uberal state offered no guarantees to particular players in the market. The market was inviolate 
but there always remained the potential for govemment to intervene in its operation, either to 
regulate the behaviour of individuals and companies and/or to promote one set of interests as 
against another set That is, neither ParUamentary enactments nor existing market arrangements 
were immutable: 'there is a danger that new legislation may destroy vested rights or disturb the 
holders of such rights in their peaceable and unrestricted enjoyment of tiiem'.^"" This was 
precisely what WoUongong's nineteenth century businessmen were about Their objective was 
always to gain access to the political process in order to have govemment, through public 
expenditure, grant them a market position which they could not attain by themselves. 
At one level, then, the argument in this thesis lends support to the pluraUst conception 
of the modem state, seeing it as subject to *a competition among divided interests with the 
30 
G. Poggi, The Development of the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction. Hutchinson: London 
1978, p.84. 
31 ibid., p. 104. 
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stmggle for factional advantage resulting in a poUtical equiUbrium'.32 ^g the tiiesis wUl show, 
govemment in nineteenth century New South Wales did operate at the centre of what Max 
Weber and other theorists of pluralism might have called a 'multi-dimensionaUty of power'.^^ 
However, that plurality of power was planted firmly within a capitaUst market economy which 
was not itself a matter for negotiation. 
Even so, the executive of the Colonial state was not merely, in the famous formulation 
of Marx and Engels, 'but a committee for managing the common affairs of the whole 
bourgeoisie'.'^'^ At the most fundamental level this was so, tiie government as already noted, 
seeing to the provision of a range of basic services and being heavily involved in capital 
formation. However, colonial society was economicaUy complex enough for deep conflicts of 
interests to arise, requiring govemment, as Buckley and Wheelwright put i t to 'perform a 
balancing act' in deciding whose interests would be protected or promoted.^^ WhUe these 
conflicts did not place capitaUsm itself at risk, they did, as Buckley and Wheelwright 
recognised, give govemment 'some autonomy in decision making'.^6 That limited autonomy, 
though, could itself become the target of decision making by private interests. 
The New South Wales govemment was certainly the target of WoUongong's 
businessmen. With rare determination they pressed their case, over decades, for pubUc 
expenditure on export faciUties for tiie WoUongong coalfield. If their actual contribution to the 
estabUshment of a coal trade in the district along with that of government was at best 
peripheral, there was one area in which they were undeniably and unambiguously successful. 
Once the businessmen decided that WoUongong must be a mining and manufacturing 
centre, they embarked on a cmsade to persuade the local population to support their vision of 
the district's future. Their success was evidenced by their abiUty to mobiUse the inhabitants to 
sign petitions, attend pubUc meetings and support the various organisations created by the 
businessmen, in order to impress Ministries and Parliaments with the legitimacy of their 
32 D. Held, Political Theory and the Modern State: Essays on State, Power and Democracy. Polity Press: 
Cambridge 1989, p.64. 
33 ibid,, p.44. See also Poggi, op.cii., p. 110. 
34 K. Marx & F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto. Translated by S. Moore. Penguin: Harmondsworth, 
England 1976, p.82. 
35 Buckley & Wheelwright loc.cit. 
36 idem. 
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requests that public money should be devoted to the attainment of their private ends. The 
businessmen were driven by a desire, indeed an obsession, for a constantly rising level of 
material prosperity. They were open about this, but were always concerned to situate their 
motive within the context of tiie very highest values of British UberaUsm, delighting in tiie 
individual liberty and choice to be enjoyed in a market society and dedicating their 
entrepreneurial capacities to the attainment of an era of material affluence in which aU 
individuals could enjoy life in abundance. In the end, however, it all resolved itself into a 
campaign to use pubUc resources to achieve private ends—in this case a pubUc port designed to 
create a coal trade which, the businessmen hoped, would fUl to overflowing die tUls of local 
business houses. 
This view of the social and economic role of nineteenth century AustraUan businessmen 
is at odds with some recent attempts to demonstrate that tiiey were in fact moved by high ideals 
of community responsibiUty. Thus, Geoffrey Ciur, writing about Melboume businessmen and 
suburban development between 1870 and 1890, accounted for tiieir dealings with govemment 
over railway building as being motivated by their liberal ideals rather than by 'sordid, 
materialistic, and often dishonest' business practices or 'speculative mania'.^7 This effort to 
rescue the reputation of AustraUa's entrepreneurs was echoed by Stevan Eldred-Grigg in his 
study of 'moral capitaUsm' among landowners in the Hunter Valley region of New South 
Wales."̂ ^ Both Cuir and Eldred-Grigg had answered Alan Birch's complaint that 
in Australia there has been very Uttie expression of pride in the activities of 
this country's pioneers in extending settiement and the exploitation of the 
antipodean continent's rich natural resources.^^ 
The activities and aims of WoUongong's nineteenth century businessmen may be adduced as 
one reason for that lack of pride. They were motivated by money, pure and simple. In fact, 
they provided a striking instance of Donald Home's observation, in his study of the impact of 
economic values on AustraUan society, that 
37 G.C. Curr, 'Liberalism, Localism and Suburban Development in Melboume 1870-1890*. Historical 
Studies. 19(14), April 1980, p.41. 
38 S. Eldred-Grigg, 'Moral Capitalism in die Hunter Valley 1880-1914'. Journal of the Royal Australian 
Historical Society, 66(2), September 1980. 
39 A. Birch, 'The Study of Business History in Australia'. Business Archives and History, 2(1), February 
1962, p.65. 
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The 'radiant, mysterious, dangerous' principle of money can move 
AustraUans deeply, providing some of the most subUme values and symbols 
of social order and much of tiie meaning of individual Uves."^ 
There was, and is, nothing uniquely Australian about this. Nonetheless, within the 
WoUongong district in the near 40 years of economic buoyancy between the gold mshes and 
the coUapse of the 1890s, there is no doubt that the dominant values were an extreme form of 
Uberal individualism. The outiook that defined the aim and purpose of its community was an 
increasingly strident beUef that material progress, prosperity and the pursuit of individual gain 
were ends of the highest social value, if not the only means by which the good society could be 
achieved. Of course, those who had settied in WoUongong before the 1850s as farmers and 
employers of agricultural labour, or as providers of commercial and professional services, did 
so with the intention of drawing a profitable Uving from the district. However, after April 
1857, when one of the wealthiest men in the Colony commenced tiie export of coal from the 
coalfield's first major mine, tiiere was an edge to public discussion of the district's economic 
future that had previously been absent. A self appointed eUte emerged which took hold of 
public policy in an attempt to engineer a particular kind of economic sttucture for the district It 
was they, the local businessmen, who formed organisations dedicated to the attainment of that 
objective and, consequentiy, it was their values and aspirations which held sway in the district. 
They were sufficiently weU organised and motivated to carry the rest of the inhabitants with 
them. Thus, the district's major newspaper, the Ulawarra Mercury, was less a journal of pubUc 
record than a mechanism for restmcturing the minds and aspirations of its readers, and the 
minute book of the business eUte which spoke for WoUongong.^'' 
Exactly why WoUongong's leaders had such faitii in pecuniary gain and valued it so 
highly is beyond the scope of this tiiesis. The point at which Westem societies estabUshed the 
principle of individual gain as the core of economic life and the guiding principle of human 
nature, or as the American economic historian Robert HeUbroner put it, created '"economic 
40 D. Home, Money Made Us. Penguin: Harmondsworth, England 1976, p.44. See also: J. King, Waltzing 
Materialism. Bsa^ct & Row: Sydney 1978 (p.45: 'Money is [its] . . . common language . . . a rigid 
yardstick of success.), and G. Nadel, Australia's Colonial Culture: Ideas, Men and Institutions in Mid-
Nineteenth Century Eastern Australia. F.W. Cheshire: Melboume 1957, especially pp.65-7 ('Money-
making'). 
41 This was not something restricted to the Wollongong press. See J.D. Moody, The Development of the 
Newspaper Press in Newcastie (1855-1880) and its Social and Political Attitudes. Unpublished M.A. 
Thesis. University of Newcastie, 1971. 
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man"—a pale wraith of a creature who foUows his adding-machine brain wherever it leads 
him','^^ occurred as part of the great transition from feudal/pre industrial society to capitalist 
market society. However, the circumstances which propeUed WoUongong's businessmen along 
that path can be established. The farming economy of the district was battered severely in the 
depression of the 1840s and, when recovery came, largely under the impems of the gold 
rushes, it only restored things to about their pre depression level. At the same time the 
economies of tiie gold bearing regions and of the Colonies of Victoria and New South Wales 
generally were expanding as tiie influx of gold seekers and immigrants created new internal 
markets. The impact of the mshes on AustraUan economy and society was enormous. 
However, as Humphrey McQueen has emphasised: 
Their effect, and this is the central point was on social consciousness. 
They sustained the beUef that advancement was possible, that the smaU man 
could make good, that capitaUsm was not without promise.'*^ 
The consciousness of the small men of WoUongong was profoundly affected by the fact 
that other districts and regions were forging ahead whUe tiieir own, far from the action, 
remained relatively static. Once, though, coal emerged as a means by which a new population 
of wage earners and their families might be brought to the district, it became their gold 
equivalent and tiiey pledged themselves to the creation of as large a coal trade as the coalfield 
could sustain. 
While their efforts had Uttie, ultimately, to do with the estabUshment of a coal trade in 
WoUongong, they had everything to do with the creation of an industrial mentaUty in the town 
and district. An understanding of this process contributes much to explaining the origins of a 
major twentieth century industrial centre, and why the inhabitants of tiie district especially its 
business leaders, shared a set of values consistent with the encouragement of economic growth 
and expansion at almost any price.'^ Those values have come under increasing question and 
42 R.L. Heilbroner, The Worldly Philosophers: The Lives, Times, and Ideas of the Great Economic 
Thinkers. 5th revised edition. Simon & Schuster New York 1980, p.35. 
43 H. McQueen, A New Britannia: An Argument Concerning the Social Origins of Australian Radicalism 
and Nationalism. Revised edition. Penguin: Harmondsworth, England 1975, p. 142. 
44 For an account of the extent to which WoUongong's twentietii century businessmen were prepared to 
accept industries known to pose high health and environmental risks, see G. Mitchell, Company, 
Community and Govemment Attitudes, and their Consequences, to Pollution at Port Kembla, with 
Special Reference to die Electrolytic Refining and Smelting Company, 1900-1970. Unpublished Ph.D. 
Thesis, University of Wollongong, 1981, 
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challenge in the late twentieth century, as the pursuit of industrial growth has bequeathed a 
legacy of major environmental problems and deep social ones arising from levels of 
unemployment and poverty tiiat it was meant to banish.'^ 
The argument in tiie thesis is organised in three parts. Part I, comprising Chapters 1 to 
5, inclusive, examines the period 1849-1871. It estabUshes tiie factors leading to the location 
of tiie first mines on tiie WoUongong coalfield, as weU as to tiie formation of tiie coaUtion of 
local businessmen that had as its object the attraction to the district of as much mining capital as 
it could absorb. They identified the lack of a namral harbour as the great obstacle to the 
attainment of that objective and, through electoral manipulation, succeeded in having the New 
South Wales govemment constmct a coal port at pubUc expense. The port was completed in 
1868, but proved a grand failure. Owners of capital responded to market and profit 
considerations rather than to the efforts of smaU business to overcome such considerations with 
artificial inducements provided at public expense. Consequently, by 1871, following 
recessions in 1863/64 and 1870, only a handful of mines were operating in the Wollongong 
coalfield 
Part II, containing Chapters 6 to 10, inclusive, deals with the response of the 
businessmen to the failure of their Wollongong Harbour poUcy. InitiaUy demoralised and 
confused, they soon formulated a new variant of their poUcy—a raUway linking the coalfield 
with Sydney Harbour, 50 mUes to the north. This was a vastiy more expensive proposition 
than a smaU coal port located in WoUongong. At fu"st it attracted no support from govemment, 
which prompted the businessmen to sound out investors in Sydney with a view to forming a 
private company which would buUd and operate the Une. That too faUed to materiaUse. 
From being merely the idea of a band of provincial speculators, the Sydney-
WoUongong raUway became a major pubUc policy issue following a period of accelerated 
growth in the economies of the Australian Colonies from 1872. As tiie demand for coal 
expanded, several Sydney investor-politicians acquired coal properties in and around the 
Wollongong district Together with the district's businessmen they worked to convince 
Sydney manufacturing and commercial interests of the benefits of cheaper coal and an 
45 See Schedvin, op.cit., p.556, for the expression of a similar view. 
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expansion of the export trade of the metropolis. This coaUtion took the proposal before the 
Parliament on two occasions, in 1876 and 1878, only to be defeated by a more powerful 
coaUtion comprising Newcastie coal proprietors and business interests, and the pastoralists of 
the interior who beUeved tiiat the £1 miUion sought for the niawarra Railway would be better 
appUed to the extension of existing lines to the wool producing regions of the Colony. 
Complex factional manoeuverings within the ParUament also contributed to those defeats. 
The Railway was finally sanctioned by Parliament in 1881. This was less the result of a 
change of heart by the regional interests which had seen to its rejection in 1876 and 1878, tiian 
of the need of Sydney business interests to secure ParUamentary support for a greatiy expanded 
programme of railway construction which required the raising of pubUc loans in Britain on a 
scale unprecedented in the Colony's history. The object was to retain for Sydney the impetus 
to trade and commerce given by the Colony's wool export trade with Britain. That impetus had 
been progressively weakened by governments in the neighbouring Colonies of Victoria and 
South Australia whose railways, linked to the inland rivers of New South Wales, were 
deUvering an increasing proportion of the latter's wool cUp to their own merchant, maritime and 
commercial interests. With vutuaUy every interest in the Colony guaranteed something in the 
new raUway programme, including Newcastie which was also to be connected to Sydney, the 
Ulawarra RaUway obtained ParUamentary approval. 
Following that approval the Wollongong coal trade underwent a period of relatively 
rapid expansion. That period, 1882-1889, is treated in Chapter 11, which is also Part HI of tiie 
thesis. V/hether the expansion of the coal trade owed anything to the line is questionable. 
Some companies may have been lured to tiie coalfield by the option of being able to ship their 
coal direct to intercolonial and overseas markets from one of the world's fmest harbours. 
However, only one company, the MetropoUtan, located inland at tiie northern extreme of the 
WoUongong district, railed aU of its output to Sydney. Every other new company constmcted 
ocean jetties. RaUway haulage costs over the escarpment and through the ragged northern part 
of the district did not aUow the line to compete with the sea routes. The expansion that occurred 
in the WoUongong coal trade in the 1880s was not the outcome of the development poUcy of 
local businessmen or of pubUcly funded transport infrastracture. 
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That however, was of no consequence to the businessmen. What mattered was that the 
district now possessed a coal trade worthy of the name. Sydney and Wollongong were not 
linked by rail untU 1888, a measure of the constmction difficulties involved. As the Unk neared 
completion, the attention of WoUongong's businessmen centred on the consequences for the 
business houses of the town of having the district's major coal port located 50 miles away. In 
order to secure for those business houses the trade of a busy maritime centre, they developed a 
third variant of their policy— t̂he Wollongong Harbour Tmst 
The Trast was to be a semi statutory authority, vested with the power, backed by an Act 
of ParUament, to bortow up to £250,000 in London for the purpose of constracting a major 
new port at WoUongong, with every mine connected to it by the Ulawarta Railway. The Parkes 
Govemment pushed the Wollongong Harbour Trast Act through the ParUament in 1889, 
handing over control of the existing public port and the WoUongong seaboard to a body 
dominated by local businessmen. However, this represented less a victory for the businessmen 
than a move by the govemment to reduce the pubUc debt, which had risen to record levels. The 
Wollongong Harbour Tmst was in fact an experiment by the Parkes Govemment in the partial 
privatisation of 'pubUc' works. If it succeeded, other regional ports in the Colony would 
similarly be weaned from direct dependence on the pubUc sector. 
The innovation proved abortive, the Trast being consumed by the economic coUapse of 
the 1890s. Appropriately, the businessmen's Harbour Trast was a victim of the results of the 
speculative pubUc bortowing excesses of the 1870s and, particularly, tiie 1880s, undertaken to 
satisfy the private ambitions of regional economic interests like those in Wollongong. The 
scheme saw them at the zenith of their power, with direct control over port constraction and the 
regulation of maritime activity in the WoUongong district. Like all their other plans it proved 
iUusory; the shaping of the coal trade had never been in their grasp. Like the coal they wanted 
to see mined in great quantities, their objectives had to await the decisions of owners of capital 
to invest in the district. And those decisions were made by people outside their control, who 
themselves were moved by forces and expectations that had littie to do with anything tiiat 
occmred in WoUongong. 
